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CIVI SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS' CONTRIBUTION
TO THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
Budi Setiyono*
D ip one go r o Unia er sity, S em ar an g
Ross H. Mcl-eod*
Au s tr zli an N ati on al Unizt er si tq
Soeharto era concern about corruption was deflected by the establishment of tooth-
less anti-corruption committees, and by suppression of anti-corruption activism
and media comment. With Soeharto's demise, activists began to pubiicise their con-
cerns more openly - at first speaking in general terms, but later making lncreas-
ingly specific allegations. The sporadic activism of the Soeharto years was consoli-
dated, first through cooperative action among similarly motivated informal groups,
and later through establishment of formal civil society organisations (CSOs) ntent
on rolling back corruption. The CSos have played a key role in pusi-ring f'o. ,re-
laws and institutions to help eradicate corruption, ald many corrupt offiiials have
been imprisoned. This paper finds littie evidence, however, ihat corruption has de-
clined significantly. It argues,that further progress depends on csos gaining a bet-
ter understanding of the underlying causes of corruption, and that these are to be
found in public sector personnel management practices.
INTRODUCTION
The utopian view of bureaucrats, politicians and parliaments is that they are a
collection of individuals who serve to represent the best interests of societr. at
]arge 
tfro_uSh policy formulation and implementation. The reality is that these
individuals can also misuse the coercive po-"t of the state to benefit particular
interests and themselves. Thus, for example, police, prosecutors and judges are
expected to protect the public from theft, fraud and violence, but can justis eas_
ily misuse their powers to shield the perpetrators of such crimes, and to extort
payment from citizens and firms by way of unwarranted accusations of criminal
behaviour. T,ikewise, politicians and bureaucrats may spend large amounts of tax-
payers'funds to create new infrastructure, regardlesi ol whether it is socially ben-
:fi.i"J, because they are able to manage the procurement process so as to enrich
their business cronies and themselves- Entruiting the .o"rli.." power of the state
to morally flawed individuals therefore brings with it the need to devise means
for monitoring and controlling_the deployme.tt of thut power. Civil society organ-
isations (csos) that focus on the struggle against corruption in the public se"ctor
are one means by which society tries to protect itself against abuse ofthe power it
has entrusted to governments and theiiofficials.
* We thank Ian Chalmers, Miyume Thnji and three anonymous reviewers for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article, and Janice Baker for editing assistance.
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This paper traces the evolution of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia
since the beginning of the Soeharto era in the mid-1960s, and of the role of CSOs
in that movement. It is not possible to determine the extent to which progress on
the anti-corruption front can be attributed specifically to CSOs, given that vari-
ous other forces have been at work simultaneously. Nevertheless, it is of interest
to review how these specialist CSOs have grown out of the less institutionalised
anti-corruption activism that emerged during the Soeharto era, and consider
the directions in which their efforts have been deployed. Of interest also is an
evaluation of the validity of these organisations' perceptions of their own suc-
cess in fighting corruption. 'Success' needs to be measured by reductions in the
prevalence of corruption, rather than by the number of new anti-corruption laws
enacted and new institutions used to detect, prosecute and punish officials for
corrupt behaviour. It is argued here that there is relatively little solid evidence
that corruption is significantly less prevalent now than it was towards the end of
the New Order period - despite, for example,. the establishment of a Corruption
Eradication Commission that has successfully prosecuted and imprisoned many
high-level officials over the last several years. Seen from this perspective, the anti-
corruption CSOs have been much less successful than may seem to be the case,
despite their entirely laudable motives. This suggests a need for them to change
the way they think about how to achieve their objectives.
A brief history of the anti-corruption movement in the Soeharto era
From as early as the 1970s a number of organisations tried to respond to the
increasingly apparent corruption that began to characterise governments under
Soeharto. In response to student demonstrations and press criticism, in ]anuary
7970 the president appointed an anti-corruption comrnittee -'The Commission of
Four' - consisting of 'generally respected' academic and rnilitary representatives
(Wilopo, I.J. Kasimo, Herman Johannes and Anwar Tjokroaminoto), along with
Indonesia's founding vice president, Mohammad Hatta, as an advise4 and Major
Ceneral Sutopo Yuwono as secretary (Mackie 1970). The committee functioned
merely as an advisory body to the president, with no authority to take any other
action. After presenting some seven reports on various public sector organisa-
tions in the next few months, it was dissolved in July 1970.The efforts of the com-
mittee had no discernible impact on the incidence of corruption.
In August 1970 the student council of the University of Indonesia organised a
seminar to analyse the government's failure to deal with corruption. Following
the seminar, student activists such as Nono Anwar Makarim, Arief Budiman,
Subchan, Emil Salim and Adnan Buyung Nasution repeatedly voiced concern
about the flourishing of corruption in government agencies (Aspinall 2005: 118;
Hamzah 2005:78-82). These protests led the government inAugust 1970 to estab-
lish a new anti-corruption committee that included a number of student activists
(Hamzah 2005:79). However, the government's commitment to the objectives of
this body, too, was illusory. The committee proved dysfunctional, with no clear
mandate and no budget. In short, the student activists' interventions were spo-
radic and had no significant impact on the operations of government.
In the early 1980s a group of retired generals and politicians signed a petition
criticising the government, and drawing attention to the spread of corruption
within the public sector and the role of Soeharto's family in this (Jenkins 1984:
Civil society organisations'contribufion to the anti^.-r--::r!-:. :::.-.r:::i-:
134-73; Kingsbury 2005:74-5). The group, n'hich became knou-n as the Petition
of Fifty (Petisi 50), persistently criticised corruption in government, thus becom-
ing a pioneer of the Soeharto era anti-corruption movement. Heavv-handed
repression from the government succeeded in marginalising the group within
Indonesian politics, however. Indeed, at that time the authoritarian regime was
highly successful in either destroying or co-opting any group that threatened its
grip on power, including those that wanted merely to maintain social control
over the government and minimise public sector mismanagement and corrup-
tion, without necessarily having any desire to change the leadership (Aspinall
2005:24-5).
From the early 1990s there was some softening of repression, and various
elements of civil society again began to organise criticism of corruption within
the government. These organisations - including Pijar (Pusat lnformasi dan |ar-
ingan Aksi untuk Reformasi, the Information Centre and Action Network for
Reform), Aldera (Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat, the People's Democratic Alliance),
and SMID (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Stu-
dent Solidarity for Democracy) - voiced concern about corruption and politi-
cal leadership at the national level (Aspinall 2005: 122-44).In the mid-1990s
Professor Amien Rais, a high-profile academic from Gadjah Mada Universitr.
and chair of the mass Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah, began to appeal
publicly for an end to the abuse of power. He introduced the famous reforruasi
(reform) slogan: 'abolish KKN (korapsi, kolusi dnn nepotisme, corruption, collu-
sion and nepotism)'. Amien Rais was concerned mainly about Soeharto fam-
ily business monopolies and dubious contracts for certain very large mining
investments. Many student organisations were also expressing concern about
the KKN problem at that time, so he was invited to speak about corruption at
numerous universities.
The anti-corruption movement in the late 1990s and beyond
The movement intensified in the late 1990s, with an upsurge of calls for reformasi
as the Asian financial crisis loosened Soeharto's grip. Actions against KKN took
place at many major cities in 1997-98, as people started to organise themselves
into innumerable informal groups intent on attacking corruption in government.
Typically such groups were established by student activists and supported by art-
ists, NCO (non-government organisation) workers and academics. Yogyakarta,
in particular - the city where Amien Rais started his anti-KKN campaign - wit-
nessed a proliferation of these groups. Together with older student organisations
such as HMI (Himpunan Mahasisiwa Islam, the Islamic Students Association),
GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian Nationalist Stu-
dent Movement), PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia,
the Indonesian Catholic Students Association) and PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa
Islam Indonesi4 the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), they demonstrated
to demand political reform and the eradication of KKN. Although the demonstra-
tions addressed various issues, the general concern with KKN was always central.
Nevertheless, these groups usually avoided pinpointing particular institutions or
focusing on individual cases of corruption. The basic objective of activists at the
time was to bring the current regime to an end and to halt corrupt behaviour by
public sector officials.
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After the Soeharto regime collapsed in Mav 1998, however, these groups began
to highlight particular cases of cormption. In Jakarta on 15 June 1998, for example,
hundreds of people demonstrated outside the attorney general's office, demand-
ing investigation of the sources of Soeharto's wealth and that of his family and
business cronies (Republika, 16 / 6 / 1998). On the same day student demonstrations
took place in various other locations, focusing on specific cases of corruption by
government officials. For example, in Tegal, Central java, students demanded
investigation of corruption allegations involving the mayor (Suara Merdeka,
16/6/1998). Similarly in Cianjur, West ]ava, thousands of people demanded the
resignation of the bupati (district head) because of alleged corruption related to
various local government projects, while in Bekasi in the Greater Jakarta area,
thousands more attended a public gathering demanding an end to illegal charges
for the provision of public services (Kompns,1,6/6/1998). Similar demonstrations
continued almost every day for several months thereafter in a wide variety of
locations, protesting about corruption in government procurement, illegal levies
imposed by officials, and corrupt behaviour by members of parliament.
Student activism inspired other elements within the community to become
involved in the anti-corruption movement. Demonstrations against KKN took
place at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other state institutions, and even in
professional associations. For example, on 10 and 15 June 1998 employees of the
state-owned international airport in Jakarta, PT Angkasa Pura II, went on strike
and organised a demonstration at the airport, demanding an end to corrupt prac-
tices within the company (Kompns,11 and 16/6/1998). On l July 1998 employees
of the Mental Rehabilitation Public Hospital in Bogor demonstrated to demand
the eradication of KKN within the management of the hospital; on the same
dav hundreds of employees of the State Electricity Company (Perusahaan Lis-
trik Negara, PLN) gathered for a mass demonstration in Jakarta, likewise calling
for the eradication of KKN in the company (Kompas,2/7 /1998).In October 1998,
several members of the Association of Indonesian Journalists (Persatuan Warta-
wan Indonesia, PWi) signed a petition and conducted demonstrations calling on
the head and secretary of the association to resign because of suspected involve-
ment in corruption; these actions resulted in the establishment of 'PWI Reformasi'
(Kompas,20/1,0/1998). On22 June 1998 hundreds of teachers in Bandung held
a demonstration at the regional parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah,
DPRD), demanding an end to 15 forms of illicit levies on their salaries (Pikiran
Ralqat,23/6/1998).
Demonstrations demanding the eradication of KKN took place not only at the
national and provincial levels but also at local government and village levels.
On 30 June 1998, for example, 100 people from Parbuluan I and Parbuluan II vil-
lages in the Dairi district of North Sumatra province demonstrated in opposition
to the sale of village land to a private company, believing the transaction to be
based on corrupt interaction between government officials and the company in
question (Kompas, 1/7 /1998). On the same day around 300 people from the vil-
lage of Lidah Kulon in East ]ava province held a demonstration at the office of
the province public prosecutor, demanding investigation of the allegedly corrupt
sale of land belonging to the village for the construction a golf course (lnwn Pos,
1/7 /1ee8).
Civil society organisations' contribution to the anti-corruption movement
Although the anti-corruption movement had begun to highlight particular
cases of corruption, at this phase of its evolution demonstrations were typically
spontaneous. The demonstrators lacke.d sufficient evidence to substantiate alle-
gations of corruption and thus to support calls for the resignation of the officials
in question. Many of the actions therefore ended without any legal steps being
taken against those under suspicion. Nevertheless, the protests attracted ry-pu-
thy from a wider range of elements of society. By the end of 1999,numeronr pio-
fessional associations, labour organisations, women's organisations, lawyers and
academics began to participate in the movement, not only providing moral and
logistical support for student activists, but also assisting them with more substan-
tive ideas and analysis. As a result, the movement became not only broader and
more active, but also more sophisticated and tactical in its approach. Neverthe-
less it remained fragmented, lacking effective coordination and a common vision.
Some of the informal associations disbanded once corruption cases had been dealt
with in the courts, while others disappeared without achieving anr. signiticant
outcome.
The remaining associations continued their struggle, however. In the nert
phase they developed more formal structures, and set up netlvorks for sharing
experiences, strategies and information, and for promoting solidaritr'. CSos such
as ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch), MTI (Masyarakat Transparansi lndonesia,
Indonesian society for tansparency) and IPW (Indonesia procurement watch)
became central to the fight against corruption in the turbulent democratic transi-
tion that followed Soeharto's demise.
Consolidation in the post-Soeharto era
The downfall of Soeharto provided an opportunity for civil society to consolidate
its anti-corruption efforts and to function largely free of constraints. In order to
confront the evident continuation of corrupt practices within the public sectoq,
and in anticipation of a possible resurgence of undemocratic government, stu-
dent activists took this opportunity to transform their informal associations into
more formal and professional anti-corruption CSOs. These were established in an
attempt to preserve the victory that had been achieved with the dislodgement of
Soeharto, and to ensure that further developments would reflect the aspirations
articulated during that battle. on 5 ]une 2000, for example, informal associations
from a number of cities - including Yogyakarta, Malang, surabaya, Bandung and
Jakarta - came together in Jakarta to establish the Indonesian Youth Front for
struggle (Front Perjuangan Pemuda Indonesia, FPPD. FPPI formalised its exist-
ence by officially registering itself, adopting a manifesto and constitution that
called for regular rotation of its board members and ongoing recruitment of new
members, and establishing a concrete organisational structure. Following this it
has been energetic in addressing corruption issues, focusing especially on corrup-
tion cases that affect the interests of people such as farmers, fishers and labourers.
some CSos grew out of a single informal association that had previously
addressed corruption issues through spontaneous action. MTI is an example of
this kind of CSO. Originally it was an informal discussion forum consisting of
student activists, retired senior government officials, journalists, bankers, private
organisation leaders and academics, who expressed concern about the direction
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of reformnsi in late 1997.r The #oup used to meet regularly during this period
to talk about national problems, releasing joint statements on various issues -
especially governance reform and corruption. In mid-1998 it formed itself into a
permanent organisation and adopted a more systematic and strategic approach to
addressing corruption and other social and political issues.
The most corunon approach, however, was the federation of a number of for-
mal and informal organisations, including street demonstrator groups, NGOs,
university organisations and academics, professional associations and even some
political parties. For example, KP2KKN (Komite Penyelidikan dan Pemberan-
tasan Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme, Committee for Investigation and Eradi-
cation of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism), a high-profile anti-corruption
CSO in Central Java, was formed by eight such organisations and a number of
individuals concerned about KKN (see <http://antikorupsijateng.wordpress.
com/ profll/ >). The organisations did not necessarily fuse themselves into one
new institutiory but contributed to its establishment by providing representatives,
facilities or funds.
Apart from newly emerging anti-corruption CSOs, a number of existing CSOs
formed for other purposes began to take part in the battle against corruption (see,
for example, Trisasongko, Schuette and Wardhana 2006). Muhammadiyah, NU
(Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's other pre-eminent mass Islamic organisation),
and YLBHI (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, the Indonesian Legal
Aid Institute Foundatiory usually referred to simply as LBH [Lembaga Bantuan
Hukum, Legal Aid Foundation]) are significant examples. As the number of cor-
ruption cases mounted at both national and local levels during the democratic
transition that began in1998, these organisations refocused their attention so as
to address anti-corruption issues, to which they had given little emphasis pre-
.,'iously. Besides undertaking anti-corruption programs themselves, these CSOs
aiso created new anti-corruption organisations in various provinces and dis-
tricts. NU and Muhammadiyah became active in undertaking anti-corruption
training, workshops and research, and engaging in related outreach through the
print media, radio talk-shows and seminars. CSOs also sponsored the establish-
ment of various watchdog and policy advocacy organisations in several cities.
LBH has been a strong supporter of anti-corruption activists, providing free legal
1 In an interview published in Media Transparansi Online in October 1998 (available at
<http:/ /transparansi.or.id/images/stories/majalah/edisll/lberlta_4.html>), Erry Riyana
Hardjapamekas mentioned several founders, including former ministers Bambang Subi-
anto (finance), Juwono Sudarsono (education and culture), Malik Fajar (agriculture) and
Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (energy and mineral resources), together with the current presi-
dent and vice president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Boediono. According to Adib
Achmadi, MTI's training and publication coordinator (interviewed by Budi Setiyono,
6 / 3 / 2008), other founders included the late Nurcholish Madjid (a prominent Islamic schol-
ar); Mar'ie Muhammad (a former finance minister); Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas (a direc-
tor of the state-owned mining company PT Tambang Timah, who was later appointed as a
commissioner of the Corruption Eradication Commission [Komisi Pemberantasan Korup-
si, KPKI; Sri Mulyani Indrawati (a lecturer at the University of Indonesia who later became
finance minister); Koesnadi Hardjosoemantri (a former rector of Gadjah Mada University);
Bambang Harymurti (journalist and editor of Tempo Magazine); and Amien Sunaryadi (a
Iecturer at the University of Indonesia, later also appointed as a KPK comrnissioner).
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consultation and advocacy, as well as legal assistance when anti-corruption activ-
ists initiated legal action against, or received threats from, allegedly corrupt indi-
viduals. On a number of occasions LBH publicly urged the acceleration of legal
processes related to corruption cases, and repeatedly called on the government to
confiscate the assets of corrupt officials and distribute them to the poor (Ternpo-
interaktif, 16/2/2007).2 By collaborating with other parties such as journalists,
academics and political parties, LBH also gave support to the establishment of
anti-corruption CSos such as FPSB (Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat, the Concerned
Forum of West Sumatra) in Padang, and BCW (Bali Corruption Watch) in Bali.
The exact number of anti-corruption CSOs is unknown, but some suggest that
there is currently at least one such organisation in every district and province; this
would imply a total of more than 500 (personal communication with Lucky Djani,
ICW activist , 16 / 7 / 2008). The total tends to fluctuate, however, as CSOs are often
short-lived. In many places, CSos are born and die following changes in socio-
political circumstances and in line with the availability of funding.
Currently, apart from generalist anti-corruption organisations, there are also
several CSos that focus on corruption in specific sectors only. For example, IP\\'
(Indonesia Police watch) works in the law and order sector; Formappi (Forum
Masyarakat Peduli Parlemen Indonesia, Indonesian Forum for Communitr"Con-
cern about Parliaments) and MP (Mitra Parlemen, Parhrers of Parliamentj focus
on the legislatures; ICM (Indonesia Court Monitoring) and LeIP (Lembaga Kajian
dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilary Institute for Assessment and Advo-
cacy for Independent Judiciary) work in the judicial sector; and BUMN watch is
concerned with corruption in state enterprises.3 This specialisation not only ena-
bles each CSO to develop a detailed knowledge of the corruption issues that char-
acterise its area of focus, but also helps the anti-corruption movement to move
forward in a more systematic way, since almost every state institution now has a
CSo counterpart that monitors its performance and insists on accountability.
The CSOs have also tried to consolidate their actions by forming alliances
and networks. In June 2000, for example, a nation-wide meeting to synchronise
anti-corruption efforts and to foster networking among csos was held in yog-
yakarta, followed by a similar meeting in Bogor in August. This resulted in the
formation of a network called GeRAK (Gerakan Rakyat Anti Korupsi, People's
Movement against Corruption). Following the establishment of GeRAK, similar
anti-corruption networks emerged at both national and local levels.
Assistance from foreign donor agencies
Assistance from donor agencies was significant in helping to transform informal
anti-corruption organisations into formal ones. During the first decade of the
democratic transition era, many international donor agencies rushed to Indo-
nesia to provide considerable funding for good governance and anti-corruption
programs, thus helping and stimulating informal associations to institutional^
ise their activities. Donor institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Devel-
2 In Makassar, for example, the local LBH branch, together with other CSos, conducted
an investigation and then filed a lawsuit in October 2008 over corrupt activities allegedly
involving the city's mayor and the Lapangan Karebosi tourism development project.
3 'BUMN' stands for 'badan usalu milik negara' (state-owned enterprise).
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opment Bank, the united Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the US
Agency for International Development (USAID), the German Society for Techni-
.uI Coop"tution, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Australian
Agency for International Development and the Japan International Cooperation
Agency, in particular, provided many millions of dollars to support governance
,"-fo.* progru-r through various means, including strengthening CSOs with
an anti-corruption focus. The approach differed significantly from that during
the Soeharto period, when donors avoided politically sensitive issues such as
corruption u.rd u".o.mtabilitV. In the democratisation years, by contrast, the
Ioweilevel of government restriction allowed donors to formulate programs that
emphasised corruption eradication, accountability and good governance. Donor
support generally has been a significant factor in enabling CSOs to undertake
theii choien mission. For example, a goal of USAID's Local Govelnance Sup-
port Program was'to achieve more effective civil society and media participation
in local [o.r".t-tu.""', and one of its sub-goals was 'to improve citizen and CSO
ability to demand better services and hold regional governments accountable'
(<http:/ /www.lgsp.or.idl >).
Donor assistance to anti-corruption programs was also channelled through the
Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (PGRI). The Partnership was ini-
tiated by a group of reform-minded Indonesians, with initial support fromUNDR
to serve as i plalform for governance reform efforts supporting Indonesia's tran-
sition to democracy - including endorsement of the need to eradicate corruption.
In supporting the anti-corruption movement, PGRI sponsored CSO projects in
i-arioui prorri.."t and districts nation-wide. By mid-2008 the organisation had
spent over $5 million on more than 60 anti-corruption projects. For example, in
Aceh, PGRI supported two CSO projects advocating sound financial management
in local governments, which led to the first conviction for corruption involving
a province governol (see below). In West Sumatra the organisation supported
ppSB's exposure of irregularities in the 2002 provincial budget, making it possi-
ble for the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi,
KPK) to obtain convictions of the governor and a number of DPRD members.
Although it is difficult to assess empirically the extent of its contributiory it
seems cleir that foreign aid has played a significant role in helping to make CSOs
effective. Anti-corruption activism is costly, especially when it involves inves-
tigations into sophisticated forms of corruption. CSOs need to gather inJorma-
tion, find evidenie of malfeasance, conduct legal analyses and, not infrequently,
pressure law enforcement agencies tirelessly through demonstrations and media
"rporrrr". 
The cost is even higher when CSOs want to initiate or advocate the
introduction of new regulations and policies. As a consequence, many CSO activi-
ties would be unaffordable in the absence of donor funding.
Such funding has not always been a pre-condition for CSOs to institutionalise
their operations, however. At the local level, when donor funds were not available,
the insiitutionalisation of the anti-corruption movement relied on the civil society
tradition of generating revenue through levies on members and donations from
the public. In Trenggalek, East ]ava, for instance, the CSO Duta Sumbreng was
estaLhshed by the people of Sumberagung village, who had suffered bureaucratic
extortion in relation to the supply of electricity, and embezzlement of government
subsidies intended for their village. The residents collected small donations in
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order to form a team to deal with these irregularities, and later established a CSO
to recoup the funds stolen by government officials (personal communication with
Dardiri, Leader of Duta Sumbreng, 1/12/2007; Duta Sumbreng, no date).
The development of some CSOs was stimulated in part by political rivalries in
local elections. Candidates needed the support of anti-corruption CSos to make
them look respectable. They were prepared to contribute financially to the cost of
CSO investigations into corruption allegedly committed by rival candidates, and
to fund demonstrations against the latter. Funding for CSOs was also obtained
in some cases from local businesses disadvantaged by corruption connected to
government procurement and the issue of licences.
ACTIVITIES AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
Commonsense suggests, and history confirms, that there is no reason to expect
corrupt officials and political leaders to reform themselves; rather, the anti-
corruption reform agenda derives mostly from civil society demanding change
(Landell-Mills 2006: 3). In Indonesia, too, relying upon elites and politicil parties
!o cTry out thoroughgoing anti-corruption programs has as yet proven largelr
fruitless. without strong demands and pressures from below, top-down reform is
unlikely. In this respect, CSOs have played a leading role in pressing the govern-
ment to establish a strong institutional and legal framework to combat corruption.
CSOs in Indonesia organise their activities as a combination of antagonism
toward and cooperation with decision makers. Sometimes they attack politicians
and bureaucrats by way of harsh public criticism and vigorous street demonstra-
tions, but not in{requently they also work hand-in-hand with poticy makers to
establish the legal and institutional frameworks and programs believed necessary
to curb corruption. This encompasses actions ranging from the formulation of
regulations to the establishment of anti-corruption bodies. Such actions are typi-
cally preceded by an examination of existing governance systems and regulations
to detect aspects that help sustain the practice of corruption, and by the prepa-
ration of recommendations. The recommendations are then injected into public
forums in the hope of attracting support. with input and support from the public,
CSOs are then in a position to deliver their proposals to parliaments and other
institutions for further deliberation. These strategic activities have focused on a
number of key areas, which we turn now to discuss.
Amendment of the Constitution
The 1945 Constitution permitted the accumulation of immense power in the
hands of the president, partly by not imposing any limit on the t-tumb". of terms
an individual could serve, and partly by not specifying how members of the
People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakya! MpR) were
to be appointed. The MPR consisted of all members of the parliament or people's
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DpR) plus an equal number
of representatives of unspecified 'regions' and 'groups'. Its main funition was to
elect a new president and vice president every five years. During the New order
period, President Soeharto gained control of the process of appointing non-DpR
members to the MPR. In addition, a number of DpR seats weie reserved for the
military, over which Soeharto eventually gained almost complete control. Finally,
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4 The establishment of the team had been mandated by Law 31 /1999 onlhe Eradication of
Corruption, which was formulated during the Habibie administration.
Soeharto limited the number of political parties permitted to contest elections for
seats in the DPR to just two othlr than his own electoral vehicle, Golkar and,by
a variety of means, Lns,rred that the latter always seculed a cleal majority of the
vote. ilith the membership of the MPR thus largely beholden to soeharto, it is
hardly surprising that he was elected unopposed for seven five-year terms from
1968 to 1998.
In view of all this, amendment of the Constitution was considered vital to
strengthening accountability in government and reducing corruption. soon after
Soehirto resi"gned in May tgg8 a*numtrer of CSOs demanded that the MPR amend
the Constitution, und then began actively trying to influence this process. In early
1999 they established ar-, ad"hoc coalition-called KOKB (Koatisi ornop untuk
Konstitusi Baru, Coalition of NGOs for a New Constitution), which engaged in a
prolonged series of activities intended to shape the,content of the desired amend-
ments (Sino, Harapan,6/4/1999,4/9 /2002).It produced a working paper to ana-
lyse the weaknesses of the existing Constitution and provide input to a new one.
ih" pup", argued that the amendments should be comprehensive - not merely a
partial modif]cation to accommodate short-term political interests (KOKB 2001)'
The coalition also demanded that the MPR form a Constitutional Commissiory
consisting of independent academics, to formulate a draft new Constitution and
to conduct a series of public discussions before its adoption'
To maximise the likelihood of their ideas being incorporated in the amended
Constitutiory activists from the coalition attended every meeting of the MPRand
its working committee. To the extent possible, they tried to contact MPR members
directly be;o.e and after such meetings to argue their case. The coalition evaluated
the progress of the amendment process each month, and encouraged the press_to
p,-,Uii.iJ" its views. It also tried to generate public awareness -of the process 
by
organising campaigns through the media, publlc discussion forums and street
de"monstr"atlorrr. Th" campaign encouraged public participation in determining
the content of the new ConstittiorU so thit the process would not be monopolised
by political elites and the ruling parties. After the MPR finally agreed to form a
Constitutional Commission in August 2002, CSO elements worked closely with
members of the commission to reshape the Constitution'
Establishment of the Joint Team for Corruption Eradication
The first strategic success of the CSos in strengthening the anti-corruption move-
ment was the eitablishment by President Abdurrahman Wahid (through Govern-
ment Regulationlg/2}0o, issued on 23 May) of the {olnt re3-m for Corruption
Eradicat[n (Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, TGPTPK)
- the first anti-corruptiori task force of the post-democratisation era.4 This team
was assigned to deal'with corruption cases that required investigation at a level
of sophiiication thought to be beyond the capability of existing law en{orcement
ug"rr.iur. Although miny activisti considered TGPTPK less than ideal as an insti-
#iorl for combaiing corruptior; they viewed its existence as better than nothing'
Accordingly, civil sJciety eilements made a significant contribution to the team's
establishirent, by *orking on its design with officials from the Department of
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Law and Human Rights. Eight CSO representatives were among the 25 members
of the TGPTPK once it was established. Howeveq, a number of corruption sus-
pects brought a legal suit against the TGPTPK in the Supreme Cour! and on 8
August 2001 it was closed down (Kompas, 9 / 8 / 2001).
Formation of the Corruption Eradication Commission
and the Court for Corruption Crimes
Following the demise of the TGPTPI! anti-corruption activists urged the govern-
ment and the parliament to establish a more permanent anti-corruption institu-
tion, which would later materialise as the KPK. The CSOs focused initially on the
introduction of a law to provide the legal foundation for the commission and an
associated special court for corruption crimes, before moving on to support the
establishment of these institutions. ICW, MTI and PGRI played a leading role,
voicing the need for an anti-corruption institution and later contributing to its
formation. These three CSos conducted public campaigns advocating corruprion
eradication as a starting point for achieving good governance, and highlighted
the success stories of similar bodies in other countries, such as Hong Kong's lnde-
pendent Commission Against Corruption and Thailand's National Counter Cor-
ruption Commission.
At that stage, however, policy makers showed little interest in creating an inde-
pendent body to combat corruption, preferring to rely on existing government-
controlled institutions. This was not surprising: many politicians and senior
officials were under suspicion of corruption at the time, and creating a new anti-
corruption agency would have directly threatened their interests. Nevertheless,
under persistent strong pressure from civil society, the DPR eventually agreed
to establish the KPK. Most DPR members wanted the commission to have only
limited authority, focusing mainly on the prosecution of suspects, but not able
to investigate allegations of corruption. Responding to this possibility, the CSos
organised public discussions to challenge the DPR's approach. To strengthen their
voice, the CSos in late 2001 formed an alliance called Advocacy for a Corruption
Eradication Commission (Advokasi untuk Komisi Anti-Korupsi, AKAK). The
objective was to ensure not only that such an institution would be established
as soon as possible, but also that it would have comprehensive authority to com-
bat corruptiory including the right to carry out investigations, examinations and
prosecutions. The possession of such comprehensive authority was considered
crucial. As one of AKAK's founders, Teten Masduki, put it, the tegal system had
been very much contaminated by the culture of corruptiorl so'if we rely on the
police and public prosecutors, we will never be able to cut the chain of corruption'
(Koran Tempo, 1 / 6 / 2002).
The alliance established a working group composed of representatives from its
member bodies. This group focused initially on practical activities. It lobbied DPR
members on the law that would provide the legal basis for the anti-corruption
agency. It carried out a national survey of public perceptions of corruption, and
forwarded the results to the DPR to support the case for enactment of such a law.
This survey revealed a number of important findings (AKAK 2002). First 94% of
respondents believed the government should establish a new institution to com-
bat corruption. Second, 69% felt that the institution should be given full authority
to investigate, examine and prosecute corruption cases. Third, 96% thought the
work of the anti-corruption institution should be overseen by a supervisory body'
Fourth, 87% wanted.members of the institution to be selected by an independent
committee, free from government intervention. Finally, 77% saw the need for a
special court to handle corruption cases. A series of meetings was held with mem-
bers of the DPR and officials of the Supreme Court, the attorney general's office,
the police, the Ministry of Justice and the State Secretariat, to discuss the scope of
authority of, and funding for, the proposed KPK. Eventually the DPR accommo-
dated the broad thrust of th" inpuf from the CSOs, and in December 2002 enacted
Law 30/2002 establishing the KPK.
Selection of KPK members
Although the 1aw had been enacted, it took some time for the government to cre-
ate these institutions. There was speculation in the media that the delay was due
to concerns in the Megawati administration that the establishment of the KPK
might damage her political interests, given that a number of then current cor-
,rritior-r allegltions involved Megawati's inner circle. Politicians from her party,
pnt-p (Partii Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle), were suspected of playing key roles in various corruption cases/ espe-
cially ttose involving IBRA (th; Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency) and the-
privatisation of certa-in SOEs. For example, Laksamana Sukardi, the Minister of
btut"-O*rl"d Enterprises, who was seen as having helped to finance Megawati's
campaign in the 20b4 presidential election, was suspected of involvement in irre-
gntuiitilt relating to the privatisation of several SOEs (Sinar Harapan, 1'4/ 4/2005,
io1s1zooo1. other Megawati ministers such as said Agil Al Munawar (Minister
of 
'Religious 
Affairs), Rokhmin Dahuri (Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fishe-
ries), aid Widjanarko Puspoyo (Director of Bulog [Badan lJrusan Logistik], the
national logistics agency) were indeed later convicted of involvement in cases of
corruption (detiknew s. com, 29 / 4 / 2007).
m)OOZand 2003, therefore, CSOs were active in generating the necessary polit-
ical comrnitment to get the institution off the ground, and then in supporting
the start-up of the commission and the selection of its members in 2004. A num-
ber of CSOs were involved in this plocess, including the members of the GeRAK
network (which had 30 CSO memters at the time) and CSOs within the Judicial
Watch Coalition (which had 10 members). On21r September 2003, after continu-
ous pressure from CSOs for almost ayear, President Megawati issued Presiden-
tial Decree (Keputusan Presiden, Keppres) 73/2003 concerning the formation of
a selection committee for the fpX. Following this, the CSOs closely monitored
the selection of members of the commission, aiming to ensure that the plocess
was transparent and allowed for public participation. They were especially dubi-
ous aboui the objectivity of the s-election committee, given that a majority of its
members represented the government rather than the public.s,Despite these con-
cerns, CSO representatives (from PGRI, GeRAK, ICW, MTI and TII [Tiansparency
International indonesia]), together with various professional consultants, assisted
the selection committee by becoming members of a technical support team. This
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5 The selection committee consisted mainly of representatives from the ministries of Law
and Human Rights, Administrative Reform, and Finance, together with the attorney gen-
eral's office, the poiice, and the State Secretariat.
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team was charged with overseeing administrative documentation, verifying the
track records of KPK candidates, evaluating candidates through written testJ and
interviews, and collecting input from the public. Involvement in this team thus
provided an opportunity for elements of civil society to offset possible political
intervention in the selection process.
After the KPK had been established, the CSOs assisted it in setting up its organ-
isation and formulating its operating principles, and helped to introduce the new
commission to the public. since then the CSos - especially MTI and pGRI - have
continued to provide strategic support. For example, PGRI supported a joint
project with international donor agencies to organise training for KpK staff, to
arrange coordination meetings with other law enJorcement agencies, and to assist
in the development of KPK's strategic planning and action plans.
Advocating the establishment of other anti-corruption institutions
Apart from fighting for the establishment of the KPK, CSOs advocated the forma-
tion of other anti-corruption institutions, using methods similar to those emplor-ed
in relation to the KPK. They argued the need for such institutions, conver.ecl their
proposals to the parliament and government departments, lobbied policv mak-
ers, and undertook media campaigns to generate public support. ny zooo, rive
other institutions concerned to some extent with anti-co.ruptiot-t obiectives had
been established, including the Centre for Financial Transactions Reporting and
Analysis, the National ombudsman's Commission, the Judicial Commission, the
Attorney General's Commissiory and the Indonesian police Commission.
Participating in formulation of the witness and victim protection Act
In the absence of meaningful legal protection, some of those who reported cor-
ruption cases to the authorities in the past had met with violence and even death.
Existing regulations had nominally afforded protection, but were ineffective
because they did not clearly specify the mechanisms for providing it, or the rights
of witnesses and victims. Besides intimidation from groups associated with cor-
rupt individuals, retaliation also took the form of allegations of 'slandering' or
'damaging the personal reputation' of those accused of corruption. The tl"*ipu-
per Republika reported (16/3/2005) that between 1998 and 2005 dozens of wit-
nesses had been terrorised, torfured, sexually abused, or penalised by the courts
for reporting corruption in various government agencies. Protection for witnesses
and victims therefore came to be seen as an important issue in corruption eradica-
tion, because witnesses - including public sector whistle-blowers - and victims
are key actors in exposing abuse.
Anti-corruption CSos relied on the same kind of approach as previously, form-
ing an Alliance for Witness Protection, and organising multi-stakeholder discus-
sion forums to direct and manage the drafting of a witness and victim protection
law. The Alliance produced a draft in 2005 and presented it to the parliament. The
urgency of having such a law became particularly apparent when an auditor from
the supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangary BpK), Khairiansyah sal-
mar; disclosed a case of corruption involving the Elections Commission (Komisi
Pemilihan Umum, KPU). salman trapped a Kpu member who offered him a
bribe in exchange for concealing corrupt kickbacks in relation to a particular KpU
project. \Arhile some csOs supported Salman, he himself was almost immediately
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accused of having improperly accepted 'transport money 
from another institu-
tion he audited (SuhJndiatio ZOOSj. This episode .as largely responsible 
for a
numberofCSOsir'rt",-t,ifyi''gtheircampaignforalawtoprovidewitnessand
victim protection. rofo*irg"reveral negotiition meetings, Law 
13/2006 on Wit-
,-'"r, ut-d Victim Protection was enacted on 18 July 2006'
Thegovernmentagainprovedreluctanttoimplement'itslegislation,however.
Some six months uft3. tnl enactment of the law it-|9d yet to take 
action - in
particular, failing to upfoi"t members of.the new Witness and 
Victim Protec-
tion Agency G"lnt ug;i"'li'-'dungal Saksi dan Korban' 
LPSK)' The CSOs again
ir"t ii"p.,,, ih"-r"irr", to force tf,e issue. Lobbying and public campaigns 
were
organised to put pt"r,,t'" ot the president' the DPR ind related 
government insti-
tutions to do what *ul'r"."ttury to -uk" the law effective' Eventually 
the gov-
ernmentbegantoact,formingacommitteetoselectLPSKmembersinApril200T'
finalising presidential d".r""! for implementation of the law in August 
2007 and
presenting its list of 14 nominees to tie DPR in February 2008. 
The DPR selected
the required ,"rr"r, JpSf members from this list on 15 July 
2008' and the LPSK
started full operations in October of that year'
Endorsing ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption
Apart from their efforts to build domestic ,,rppoit, CSOs.have 
tried to strengthen
the anti'corruption tno,,",11"',t through transnational links. 
In particula', t"'
urged the governm""a a ratify the ljnited Nations Convention Against 
Cor-
ruption (UNCAC), ^rgu;rrh"i 
this would demonstrate moral responsibility on
Indonesia,s part withi? th! international community, but also- 
oblige the govern-
ment to comply -ith-th";;;visions of the convention 
and become part of the
intemational.oop"ruti,,"efforttofightcorruptionqCry?0-gq'4-5)'Onseveral
occasions CSO activilts, especially ii.or" from ICW and MTI, 
met with policy
makersintheDPltandrelevantgovernmentagenciestodiscussthisissue.Atthe
same time, to generate public concern and stipport' activis-ts 
contributed opin-
ion pieces to newspapers on the importance of iatlfying the 
UNCAC' Eventually




to monitoring th" i;;i"t "r-r,u,ior-t 
of the convention within government policies
and programr. A.ruri1be, of them undertook an assessment 
of the compliance of
Indonesian ru-, *itn uNCAC principles, and presented. their report 
(ICW 20-0q)
tothesecondUNCACConferenceofstut",Parties,hostedbyTndonesiainBali
from 28 January to 1 FebruarY 2008'
ACTIONS AT THE PRACTICAL LEVEL
CSosinlndonesian'"""r''putconsiderableeffortintocombatingcorruptionat
the practical level. overall, this effort aims to achieve at 
least four obiectives: first'
to raise awareness u-o"gin" general public about the dangers of corruption 
and
create a grassroots movJment"to reduce its prevalence;-second, 
to detect corrup-
tion and punish those involved in it; third, io prevent the 
continued loss of state
assets; and fourth, to recover state assets captuied by corrupt 
officials' Despite the
difficulty of *"u,.,,"i.'g p'og."'' in relation to these objectives, efforts 
to achieve
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TABLE I Reports of Corruption Receizted from the public






Under examination at end of vear
Of examined reports
No action taken (incomplete 1,050
documentation, non-corruption
cases, or junk maii)
Reports with substantive indica- 1,231
tions of corruption
Of which:
Delivered to relevant institutions 1,089
Returned to source for clarifica- 115
tion or additional information
Under internal process in KPK




















a 'The public' includes CSOs and individuals.
S o u r c e : Muhar diasyah (2008).
them appear to have had some success in spreading the 'anti-corruption virus,
throughout Indonesian society and in recapturing illegally appropdated assets.
The following section discusses the work of CSOs in thii ui"r,i.-
Bringing corrupt figures to justice
During the last 10 years CSos have been key actors in bringing abusers of public
office to justice. According to Doni Muhardiasyatu head o] research and devel-
opment at KPK most of the corruption cases prosecuted successfully have been
the subject of corruption allegations reported by CSos to law enforcement agen-
cies such as the police, the public prosecutor and the KpK (Muhardiasyah 2d0g).
Without the CSOs' contributiory he added, it is unlikely that efforts to eradicate
corruption would have made as much as progress as they have. Table 1 shows
progress made on matters reported to the (pKly CSos and indlviduals.
One of the most celebrated achievements of the anti-corruption movement in
bringing corrupt officials to justice was the sentencing of the former governor
of Aceh, Abdullah Puteh, to 10 years in prison in March 2005. A CSoln Aceh,
lommgnill Solidarity Against Corruption (Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti-Korupsi,
SAMAK), became aware of allegations that the governor had received a kickbick
on the purchase of an Mi-2 helicopter from Russia (the purchase having been
undertaken without any competitive tender). SAMAK reported its suspicions in
early 2003 by way of letters to the offices of the Aceh province prosecutor and the
national attorney general, but neither agency appeared to act on the allegations.
After a year with no significant progress, another CSo, the Aceh people,s Sohdar-
ity Against Corruption (solidaritas Rakyat Aceh Anti Korupsi, soRAK), reported
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the case to the KPK inJanuary 2004, when some KPK commissioners were visiting
the province. The matter was investigated and the governor was sent for trial in
the court for corruption climes, which found him guilty of corruption. This was
the first time the fFf naa acted on a report of alleged corruption from the public.
The episode highlighted the ability of CSO activists to bring'big fish' to justice,
and boosted their confidence in doing so.
Following this widely reported anti-corruption success in Aceh, similar actions
began to take place all over Indonesia, involving all levels of government (table 2).
At the nationil level, for example, Government Watch (GoWA) reported coffup-
fion involving the Department of Religious Affairs, while the Indonesian Forum
for Budget Tri.tput"t"y (Forum Indonesia untuk Tiansparansi Anggaran, FITRA)
"rpor"J "orruption 
involving the Elections Commission. In many provinces and
districts, CSO reports of budgetary irregularities were instrumental in bringing
DPRD members, province governors, mayors and district heads before the courts.
Many of these success stories have been documented in books (for example, PGRI
2006; Stephens, Farouk and Rinaldi 2006), research reports and the media.
Not all CSO efforts to uphold justice have met with success, howevet. Despite
trying in numerous ways to make their voices heard, their work is often ignored
by the bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies. Many cases of corruption that
C-SOs have brought to the attention of the authorities simply disappear without
any resolution because law enforcement agencies fail to act. Moreover, several
gnity verdicts at district court level have later been revoked by provincial courts
iollowing appeals by those convicted. Similarly, several court decisions at provin-
cial levef hive been overturned on appeal to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
the work of CSO activists has become a serious threat to corrupt officials in vari-
ous state institutions - including the legislatures - with thousands of individuals
investigated or under investigation.
Providing anti-corruption awards
In order to promote anti-corruption sentiment within the community, a number
of CSOs have made anti-corruption awards to people who work conscientiously
against corruption and contribute to increased transparency in government. In
August 2001, Government Watch presented the'GoWAAward' posthumously to
the late Baharuddin Lopa, aformer attorney general who was respected as a pros-
ecutor of the highest integrity. In December 2007, the Madani Professional Society
presented anti-corruption awards to three DPR members from different parties
ior their role in initiating a parliamentary inquiry into various cases of corruption.
The processes for making iuch awards vary across CSOs, but a typical approach
is foi a committee to select winners from among individuals nominated by the
public. The Bung Hatta Anti-corruption Award is perhaps the most prestigious
tf th"r" honours. It is named after Indonesia's first vice president, Mohammad
Flatta, whose anti-corruption stance was legendary. A committee of prominent
CSO activists has presenied this award biennially since 2003. Nominations for the
award come from CSOs and the general public.
organising anti-corruption training and promoting public awareness
A further aspect of strengthening the anti-corruption movement is the provision
of training by CSOs. Training for individuals usually aims, perhaps somewhat
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Corruption Cases
TABLE 2 Examples of Corruption Cnses Exposedby CSOs
Year CSOs Involved in Reporting
National level
Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance 2000
Department of Religious Affairs 2004
Elections Commission budget 2005
Provincial level
PT Bank NTB, West Nusa Tenggara 2001-02
Helicopter procurement in Aceh 2002
Lampung disaster fund 2003
Misappropriation of provincial 2003
budget in West Sumatra
Misappropriation of provincial 2004
budget in South Sumatua
Misappropriation of budget of 2007
Tadulako University, Palu, Central
Sulawesi
Local level
Misappropriation of district govern- 2002
ment budget in Mentawai, West
Sumatra
Embezzlement of subsidy for Bestari 2002
Foundatiory Pontianak, West Kali-
mantan
Misappropriation of district govern- 2003-04
ment budget in Donggala, Central
Sulawesi
Misappropriation of district gov- 2004
ernment budget in Toraja, South
Sulawesi
Misappropriation of district govern- 2004
ment budget in Malang, East Java
Forest Resource Fund and 2004
Reforestation Fund in several dis-
tricts and provinces
ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch)
GoWA (Government Watch) and FITRA
(Forumlndonesia untuk Transparansi
Anggarary Indonesian Forum for Budget
Transparency)
FITRA and LBH (Lembaga Bantuan
Hukum, Legal Aid Foundation)
SOMASI (Solidaritas Masyarakat untuk
Transparansi, Community Solidaritr. for
Transparency)
SAMAK (Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti-
Korupsi, Community Solidarity against
Corruption) and SoRAK (Soiidaritas
Rakyat Aceh Anti Korupsi, Aceh People's
Solidarity Against Corruption)
KoAK (Komite Anti-Korupsi, Anti-
corru ption Committee) Lampu ng
FPSB (Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat, the
Concerned Forum of West Sumatra)
GRP (Gerakan Rakyat Palembang, Palem-
bang People's Movement)
KMAK (Koalisi Mahasiswa Anti-Koru psi,
Student Anti-Corruption Coalition)
AMM (Aliansi Masyarakat Mentawai,
Mentawai Community Alliance)
Local NGOs and haditional kingdom
(Amantubillah Palace) of Pontianak
KRM (Koalisi Rakyat Menggugat, the
People's Coalition Accuses)
AJT (Aliansi Jurnalis Toraja, Toraja Jour-
nalists Alliance) and AMTAK (Aliansi
Masyarakat Toraja Anti-Korupsi, Toraja
Community Anti-Corruption Alliance)
MCW (Malang Corruption Watch)
KONSTAN (Koalisi LSM untuk Kon-
servasi Hutan, NGO Coalition for Forest
Conservation)
Source: Compiled by the authors from media reports
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naively, to provide an understanding of corruption and how to avoid it, while
training for organisations usually deals with building capacity to fight corrup-
tion externally and internally. Major anti-corruption CSOs such as MTI, ICW TII
and FITRA also provide 'training of trainers' (ToT) services for CSO activists. Of
these organisations, MTI and FITRA conduct ToT in cities Indonesia-wide, with
a particular focus on regional government budget monitoring. Participants in
such training include NGO staff, student activists, civil servants and profession-
als engaged in anti-corruption activities. The training not only imparts an under-
standing of corruption but also encourages participants to become involved in the
anti-corruption struggle. Some participants go on to monitor implementation of
their own regional governments' budgets, and this has led to the disclosure of a
number of corruption cases in various districts.
Almost a1l CSOs involved in anti-corruption work also organise seminars, com-
petitions and workshops designed to raise public awareness of corruption issues.
They target quite diverse groups of people, including civil servants, journalists,
workers, teachers and even school children.
MEASURING'SUCCESS' IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
The ultimate aim of the anti-corruption movement, presumably, is a significant
reduction in the prevalence of corruption in the public sector. Actions such as
setting up new corruption-fighting institutions and bringing corrupt individuals
to justice must be recognised merely as instruments for achieving this desired
outcome. They should not be confused with the outcome itself.
By way of analogy, consider the attempt, common to most highly developed
countries, to eradicate the use of recreational drugs such as marijuana, cocaine
and heroin by making their supply illegal. Specialist institutions such as the
Drug En{orcement Agency in the US have been established, and there are fre-
quent reports of seizures of illegal shipments of illicit drugs. But the reality is
that the supply of drugs never ceases because the incentives to engage in this
activity remain in place, so that for every dealer or drug lord imprisoned there
is another ready to take his place. Much the same is true of corruption in Indo-
nesia. Enforcement institutions have been established, and they have succeeded
in imprisoning many officials convicted of corruption. Yet corruption persists at
a high level and, although there is some evidence that it is in decline, this is not
entirely persuasive.
Figure 1 presents indices of three aspects of governance in Indonesia, two of
them ('rule of law' and 'control of corruption') drawn from the World Bank's
Goaernance Mntters database, and the third (the 'corruption perceptions index')
from the database of Transparency International. Possible values for the first
two indices range from -2.5 to +2.5, while those for the third range from 0 to 10.
On all three indices, Indonesia's performance has been improving noticeably
since about 2000-02. Its absolute score on all three measu.res remains very low,
however - negative in the case of the first two and below 3 in that of the third.
This is reflected in figure 2, which presents the ranking by corruption percep-
tions index scores of some 180 countries in 2009: Indonesia was ranked at111.,
slightly above Vietnam and the Philippines, but well below most of the other
important economies in Asia.
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FIGURE 1 Trends in Aspects of Gooernance in Indonesisu
Corruption perceptions index (rhs)
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a Possible values of the'rule of law' and 'control of corruption' indicators range from -2.5 to +2.5. The
value for the corruption perceptions index ranges from 0 to 10.
Sources:'Rule of law' and 'control of corruption': World Bank Goaernance Mntters database, <http:/ /
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>; corruption perceptions index: Tiansparency Inter-
national, <http: / / w v,tw.transparency.org/tools/ measurcment>.
































a Indonesia's rank was 111, with a score o{ 2.8. The chart dcpicts scores for 180 countries.
Source: Ttansparency International, available at <http://www.kansparency.org/>.
366 Budi Setiyono and Ross H. Mcleod
Indonesia also compares poorly with most Asian countries on one of the key
aspects of Transparency lnternational's Global Corruption Barometer (table 3). Of
respondents to the survey questiory 'In the past 12 months, have you or anyone
living in your household paid a bribe in any form?', some 29% answered in the
affirmative - a much higher proporfion than for any country in the Asia Pacific
region other than Cambodia. Moreover, the proportion reporting having paid
bribes had increased from just 13% and 1.8% in 2004 and 2006, respectively. On
this evidence, the prevalence of corruption on what is a very direct indicator is not
oniv high but increasing, not decreasing. This raises the question whether surveys
of corruption perceptions in Indonesia in recent years may have been distorted
by the heavy emphasis given to the government's anti-corruption rhetoric, and
by the imprisonment of large numbers of officials for corruption - something that
virtually never happened during the Soeharto era. In other words, it seems likely
that there is an entirely understandable increase in the perception that something
is being done about corruption, but this is not the same as a finding that the inci-
dence of corruption is declining.
There were those who naively believed that Soeharto was the cause of cor-
ruptiory and that removing him from office would therefore bring corruption
to an end. It is equally naive to imagine that establishing mechanisms by which
scores or even hundreds of officials can be imprisoned for corruption will end
corruption. In this sense, what appear at first glance to be considerable achieve-
ments on the part of the anti-corruption movement in general, and the specialised
anti-corruption CSOs in particulal, seem rather hollow. Regardless of the numer-
ous battles wory there seems to have been little or no progress in the war itself.


























a Respondents were asked: 'ln the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid
a bribe in any form?'.
b The corresponding figures for Indonesia in 2004 and 2006 were 13% and 1B%, respectively.
Source: Transparency International,2009 Clobal Corruption Barometer Report, landned 3 June 2009,
available at <http: / / www.transparency.org/ >.
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This raises the question whether thinking about corruption hitherto has missed
the point. CSOs and other protagonists have failed to put forward any meaningful
analysis of the underlying causes of corruption. They attribute corrupt behaviour,
implicitly, to moral weakness on the part of the individuals concerned, and the
solution to the problem is formulated in terms of punishing coffupt behaviour.
The underlying reasoning is that if a sufficient number of corrupt officials can
be imprisoned, corruption will begin to disappear. \44ren corrupt behaviour is
endemic, however - which is clearly the case throughout most of Indonesia's pub-
lic sector - this approach is very likely to threaten the interests of the very people
given responsibility for implementing it. The more successful the effort to pun-
ish corrupt officials, the stronger the backlash from institutions whose members
face the possibility of a significant decline in their overall incomes at best, and
of imprisonment at worst. Recent changes in the legislation relating to the KPK
(Patunru and Von Luebke 2010: 9-10), and the attempt by certain police officials to
emasculate the commission by bringing bogus charges of corruption against two
of its commissioners, must be seen in this light (Baird and wihardja 2010:14s).
CAUSES OF CORRUPTION
Mcleod (forthcoming) argues that corrupt behaviour is an inevitable conse-
quence of human resource management practices in the public sector. There is
little attempt to ensure that the total remuneration of public sector officials is
broadly comparable with that of their peers in the private sector (that is, indi-
viduals with similar training and working experience). At the higher levels of the
bureaucracy, formal remuneration (basic salary plus allowances) is a small frac-
tion of private sector remuneration rates. on the face of it, to seek employment
in the public sector under these circumstances would be economically irrational.
In reality, however, the number of new graduates seeking recruitment into the
public sector vastly exceeds the number of positions available, and it is common
for bribes to be paid, or family connections to be called on, to ensure recruitment.
The only obvious explanation for this phenomenon is that applicants expect that
their career incomes will significantly exceed their formal entitlements. \A4rile
many of them may not envisage direct involvement in corrupt interactions in the
future, they would still be well aware of the wide variety of in{ormal mechanisms
that exist for distributing some of the proceeds of such interactions throughout
the bureaucracy. To the extent that acceptance of various kinds of income sup-
plements results simply in total remuneration comparable with that of private
sector peers, this is typically not even regarded as corrupt behaviour. Indeed, it
could reasonably be argued that this amounts to nothing more than'economic
self-defence', given the government's failure to observe its own legal obligation to
provide its employees with'a fair and reasonable salary commensurate with their
work and responsibilities' (Law 43/1999 on the Civil Service, article7).
If the operating budgets of government agencies are insufficient to provide fair
and reasonable salaries, the only way to overcome this is through the very corrup-
tion that is the focus of the CSOs under discussion here. And it is obvious that gov-
emment officials capable of finding corrupt ways to generate additional funds are
unlikely to stop at the point where the sum of their formal and informal incomes
matches private sector levels. Accordingly, it is widely known that many high-level
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officials have become fabulously wealthy over the course of their careers (Synner-
strom 2007: 169). Though the benefits from corruption presumably flow dispropor-
tionately to those best practised in this art, many other officials depend heavily on
informal supplementation of their meagre formal remuneration. This means that
they, too, are threatened by an anti-corruption approach that focuses almost exclu-
sively on punitive action against those guilty of transgressing the rules.
CONCLUSIONS
Over the last several decades the concern of civil society to protect itself against
predation by its elected representatives and government officials has given rise
to an increasingly sophisticated and organised anti-corruption movement. The
informal activism that was easily repressed during the Soeharto ela has now
evolved into an active collection of anti-corruption CSOs, which have become an
inJluential part of the democratic process that has emerged in Indonesia since the
late 1990s. These organisations, strongly assisted by foreign donor agencies, have
taken the lead in attempts to improve the integrity of government through both
strategic and more practical, day-to-day activities. At the strategic level they have
involved themselves deeply in institutional reform, contributing to the process
of amending the Constitution; to the establishment of a Corruption Eradication
Commission and the selection of its commissioners; to the enactment of a law
that, among other things, aims to protect public sector whistle-blowers; and to the
ratification by Indonesia of UNCAC. At the practical level they have been active
in reporting cases of alleged corruption to law enforcement agencies; in ensuring
that the work of anti-corruption champions is publicly acknowledged; in rais-
ing public awareness of, and concern about, corruption; and in training officials
and other individuals with responsibility for, or an interest in, participating in the
struggle against corruption.
At a superficial level, much appears to have been achieved. New anti-corruption
institutions have been created, and numerous government officials have been
imprisoned for corrupt behaviour. But the true measure of success in this field
is the extent to which the prevalence of corruption has been reduced. Unfortu-
nately, available measures of the extent of corruption do not present a convincing
case that it has declined significantly in the last decade. Rather, they suggest that
the CSOs have in fact made relatively little progress toward achieving their basic
objective. The explanation for this would appear to be a failure to understand the
causes of corruption. Without such an understanding, there is little hope of deal-
ing with it effectively.
It has been argued here that endemic corruption in the public sector is in large
part the consequence of a key aspect of human lesource management policy: the
vast gap between private sector and public sector remuneration at managerial
levels. While it is important to have mechanisms to investigate allegations of cor-
ruption and to punish those proven to be involved in it, these mechanisms are
incapable of eradicating corruption when it is endemic. If Indonesia's CSOs want
to bring about any significant reduction in the prevalence of corruption, they will
need to shift their emphasis toward insisting that the government meet its legal
obligation to provide its employees with fair and reasonable salaries cofiunensu-
rate with their work and responsibilities.
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